What makes European culture unique?
What makes European culture unique?

       In general, the uniqueness of culture may stem either from nature or from nurture – the same old perpetual division, but I think we are now in a better position than before to deal with these issues, and I will argue that both are important. Western culture has known unique cultural transformations that no biological/evolutionary theory could have predicted, but it has also known a unique evolutionary history. Western culture was built by people genetically different from those who built other world civilizations and cultures. In the following, I will discuss the uniqueness of the situation of European cultures in comparison with other traditional civilizations:

  • The Catholic Church and Christianity.
  • The tendency towards monogamy.
  • The tendency towards a simple family based on the nuclear family.
  • The tendency is greater towards an accompanying marriage based on mutual affection between the spouses.
  • Lack of focus on extended kinship relations and related matters, or the relative lack of ethnocentrism.
  • The tendency toward individualism and all its effects: individual rights against the state, representative government, moral universalism, science.

The area of my background lies in evolutionary biology, and among the first questions that struck me when exposed to the theory of sexual development was “Why were European cultures single marriage ?

 The theory of sexual evolution is very simple: females have to invest heavily in reproduction – pregnancy, lactation, and often taking an extraordinary amount of time to take care of children. As a result, female reproduction is very limited. Even under the best conditions that can surround a woman, say, 20 children. However, the act of reproduction is easy for men. As a result, men benefit from polyandry, although it is expected that rich and powerful men should use their wealth and power to secure as many husbands as possible. In short, intense polyandry by rich and powerful men is the best strategy for men. That is, it is a behavior that greatly improves a man’s reproductive success.

The theory is well supported. There is a strong correlation between wealth and reproductive success. In traditional societies all over the world, wealthy and powerful men can control a large number of females. The elite men of all the traditional civilizations across the world, including those of China, India, Islamic societies, the civilizations of the modern world, ancient Egypt and ancient Israel, had thousands or perhaps hundreds of thousands of concubines. In sub-Saharan Africa, women were generally able to raise children without the support of the father. The result was a low level of polygamy as men competed to control as many women as possible. The children of these relations were legitimate. They could inherit property and were not despised by the common people. The Chinese emperor had thousands of concubines, and in the Guinness Book of Records, the Moroccan sultan had 888 sons.

To be sure, there are other societies where polygamy is the principle. It is common practice to differentiate ecologically imposed monogamy from socially imposed monogamy. In general, ecologically imposed monogamy exists in societies that have been forced to adapt to harsh environmental conditions such as those of deserts and the Arctic.Under extreme conditions such as these, it is impossible for males to control excess females because the investment in each male must be directed to the children of one woman. The basic idea is that under extreme circumstances a woman may not be able to take care of children on her own but will need male support. If these conditions persisted for an important evolutionary time, one might conclude that the population might develop a tendency toward monogamy. In fact, one might imagine that the tendency towards monogamy may become so strong that it may emanate from it psychological and cultural tendencies towards monogamy even in the face of changing environmental conditions. Later I will suggest that this is precisely what happened with the development of Europeans.

Richard Alexander uses the term “socially imposed monogamy” (SIM) to refer to situations in which monogamy emerged even in the absence of harsh environmental conditions.  Harsh conditions mean that men need to take care of sons directly, but in other situations we generally expect and find that males compete for as much as they can demand of wives.

The first example of the uniqueness of the West

While all the economically advanced cultures in the world were characterized by polygamy through successful males, Western societies, from the Greeks and Romans to the present, had a strong tendency toward monogamy.

Ancient Rome had various political institutions and ideological support that favored monogamy. [3] The origins of socially enforced monogamy in Rome have been lost in history, but there were some mechanisms to preserve monogamy, including laws that reduced the legal status of children born outside monogamy, mores opposed to divorce, and negative social attitudes toward Inappropriate sexual behavior and the religious ideology of sexual modesty for monogamous couples. The diversity of these mechanisms continued throughout the history of the West until the present.

During the period of the Roman Republic, there were also mechanisms that prevented political tyranny by any aristocratic family, including reducing the mandate of the consuls, and to two consuls at the same time. The legal requirements for political representation of the lower regimes have gradually developed. For example, demagogues, besides this, there were comprehensive laws prohibiting the marriage of relatives. These laws prevented a focus on wealth within kinship groups and thus prevented the domination of any aristocratic family. 

Battles over monogamy became an important feature of the Middle Ages as the Catholic Church attempted to impose monogamy on the elite males. The Catholic Church was a unique aspect of Western culture. When Marco Polo visited China in the 13th century and Cortez arrived in the Aztecs in 1519, they found many similarities with their society, including hereditary nobility, priests, warriors, and artisans, and that all peasants subsisted on an agricultural economy. Thus, there was a great convergence between the communities. However, they have not found societies where religious institutions claim superiority over secular institutions and successfully modify the reproductive behavior of the secular elite. Nor did they find a king like Louis IX (Louis Saint) who ruled France while living his life as a monk with his only wife, and in which he launched a crusade to liberate the Holy Land.

The Catholic Church was the heir to Roman civilization where monogamy was rooted in law and custom, and during the Middle Ages it took on the task of imposing monogamy on the emerging European aristocracy. To be sure, the level of polyandry among European aristocrats in the Middle Ages declined compared to the harems of Chinese or Islamic countries. However, this may be due especially to the relatively underdeveloped economic situation of the advanced middle ages. After all, the Chinese emperor led a vast, populous country with a huge economic surplus. They were more wealthy than the chieftains of medieval Europe, and they used that wealth and power to get more women.

In any case, polygamy did exist in Aruba, and during the Middle Ages it became the subject of a struggle between the Church and the aristocracy. The church was “the most important and influential institution of government [in Aruba] during the medieval period”. The main manifestation of the domination of this power over the secular aristocracy involved the disciplines of sex and reproduction. The result was that the same rules of sexual behavior were imposed on both the poor and the rich alike. The Church’s program “required, moreover, that all lay people, especially the powerful ones, submit to the authority of the Church and allow it to supervise their morals, especially their sexual morals. By this means, through marriage, the aristocrats were able to remain under scrutiny. All marital problems were entrusted to the church alone to broadcast in it. 

An attempt to understand the behavior of the church during this period in terms of evolutionary psychology is beyond the scope of this paper.  One might note, however, that the desire for power is a universal human thing, but like all human desires, it needs to be linked to the success of reproduction. In the same way, people desire sex, but initiating sex does not necessarily lead to having many children even if Mother Nature designed it that way.

One of the unique features of the church is that its popularity was bolstered by the image (and reality) of being altruistic. The medieval church successfully represented the image of its lack of interest in controlling women or having a high level of reproductive success. This was not always the case. Before the medieval reforms, many priests had wives and concubines. Saint Bonivace wrote of the French Church in 742 A.D., complaining to the pope about “the so-called deacons, who have spent their lives since boyhood in immorality and fornication, and all kinds of indecency, who entered the Diaconate of this reputation, and who now, while possessing four or five mistresses, On their beds, they still read the Bible.” 

Nevertheless, reform among the clergy was real. No English bishop in the 13th century is known to have a wife or family. Married clergy even at lower levels during this period were exceptional in England. The lower levels of sexual submissiveness of the clergy continued during the reform period.

Hence, the church displayed the image of charity and altruism. Its strength and richness were not directed towards reproductive success. True heterosexuality appears to be a factor in the widespread attraction to highly ascetic monastic lifestyles. This asceticism was an important part of the public perception of the Church during the High Middle Ages. During the 11th and 12th centuries thousands of temples were established. Composed of bachelors and male ascetics chiefly from the wealthy classes, “the temples determined the spiritual character of the whole Church, in education and in art, [and] in the transmission of culture…”  The image of ascetic altruism was also reinforced by ideology in which it is believed that monks’ prayer helps All Christians.

These systems helped provide a very popular image of the church. During the 13th century, mendicant friars (Dominican, Franciscan) contributed to church reform to extend the authority of the Pope over the church, to strengthen the rules of celibacy in monks, to prevent favoritism and to buy and sell priestly office Simony, and to give the church an alternative authority to secular authority, including the ability to regulate sexual relations. “The voluntary poverty, the self-imposed destitution that distinguished the early beggars with the most humble and disadvantaged segments of the population, in stark contrast to the professionalism and ostentation of the secular clergy, corporate wealth, and the exclusivity of monasteries, stirred conscience and influenced the generosity of trade associations.” 

It is one of the most extraordinary phenomena in all the history of the High Middle Ages… Many of the upper class, wealthy or less prosperous members of society, who had the best chances of enjoying worldly pleasures entirely, have given up them… The influx of new candidates to those places has been astonishing as the rules of life have been restored. Monasticism in its former strictness, imposed more strictly or even more harshly redefined… We must suppose that the primary motive for choosing monastic life has always been the eschatological ideals of monasticism, even if these have lost some of their motive power in the course of a long life or were mixed with other motives. From the beginning.

During the 13th century, mendicant monks were usually recruits from the aristocracy, nobles of the land, and other wealthy families. Their parents often disagreed with their decisions, and it is possible that they, like all fathers, wanted grandchildren. “It was a nightmare for well-to-do families for their sons to become monks” These families began to avoid sending their sons to universities because of the deep-seated fear that their sons would be conscripted into religious life.

At the center of society is an ideological institution that says that people should be altruistic, and that they should be celibate even if they are born rich. This explains the popular acceptance of the church’s authority in relation to marriage and sexuality, but it still makes one wonder why well-off people enter monasticism and become celibate at all. Like it or not, whatever one might say about Western Europe during this period, eugenics wasn’t part of the picture.

The medieval church was a unique feature of Western culture, but one of the themes of this paper is that it was not mostly European in critical respects. This is because Medieval Europe was a collectivist society with a strong sense of identity and collective commitment, and I would argue that Western societies are also unique in their commitment to individualism – in fact individualism is the hallmark of Western civilization.

The collectivism of Western European society in the late Middle Ages was real. There was a strong communal identity and a communal commitment to Christianity at all levels of society, as indicated, for example, by the abundance of pilgrims and the outpouring of religious fervor and fervor within the group related to the Crusades to liberate the Holy Land from Muslim control. The Christian Church had a strong sense of the economic interests of the Christian group vis-à-vis the Jews, and often worked aggressively to exclude Jews from influence in the economy and politics and to prevent sexual relations between Christians and Jews. 

As explained above, there were also high levels of reproductive heterosexuality, especially among mendicant monks, many other clergy, and ultimately among the secular elite. Reproductive heterosexuality among the secular elite was mainly the result of coercion but there are also cases of voluntary restraint, as in the case of Louis IX of France – Saint Louis. Lewis was not only an exemplary model of clean Christian behavior. He also had a keen sense of the economic interests of Christian famines vis-à-vis the Jews and was deeply involved in the Crusades to reclaim the Holy Land for Christian control.  Europeans saw themselves as part of an inner group together against non-Christian groups (particularly Muslims and Jews) who were considered powerful and threatening enemies. 

There were indeed gaps between the ideals of a united Christian community based on the power of the church and the sexual restraint among the elites. However, these gaps must be balanced by recognizing that many medieval Christians and especially the central actors such as: ascetic movements, mendicant monks, Reformed popes, zealous crusaders, devout pilgrims, and even many aristocratic elites, see themselves as part of a group Strongly united supranational. It was this highly unified collective orientation—so alien to contemporary Western life—that made the characteristic of the higher levels of committed and altruistic group compréhensible in the medieval period psychologically.

Social Controls and Ideology Maintaining Imposed Monogamy in Western Europe

In Western Europe the Church adopted an ecclesiastical model of marriage that in every sense of the word opposed the reproductive interests of the aristocracy. As a direct result of these efforts, shifts occurred in the family structure and the social enforcement of monogamy by the Christian Church at the end of the 12th century. The following factors seem to be most important in enforcing and maintaining monogamy:

Preventing Divorce : Wealthy males benefit most from being able to divorce easily because they can marry more easily. While divorce was common in Eurasian societies and was legal among pre-Christian tribes in Europe, the Christian view was that marriage was monogamous and irrevocable. Divorce became more restrictive than before under the Roman Christian emperors, and between the ninth and twelfth centuries the church began a successful struggle with the aristocracy centered around a series of divorces involving the nobility. For example, in the late 12th century, King Philip of France was forbidden to divorce his wife even though he did not like her and she was barren. The king had to apologize to a group of clergy in a monastery in France.

At times when divorce was permitted, but only if it was intended that the male would obtain an heir in cases where the first marriage had not succeeded in producing one. For example, Louis VII and Eleanor of France in the Middle Ages. (However, the Pope did not allow Henry VIII to divorce his wife even if they had no children.) Divorce was “virtually impossible except for a very few very wealthy” in Britain until the reforms of 1857. Nevertheless, divorce rates remained very low. “In those European regions that legalized divorce in the sixteenth century, it took three hundred years or more before the divorce line was distinguished from the horizontal axis of the graphic representation of divorce rates.” In England the divorce rate remained less than 0.1/1000 marriages until 1914 and less than 1/1000 marriages until 1943 (Stone 1990), in 1910 none of the European countries had a divorce rate higher than 5/1000 people. As far as I know, this strong anti-divorce tendency is unique to Western European culture.

Penalties for Illegality : From an evolutionary perspective, the most important aspect of reproductive social controls is the control of transmission. Controls of illegitimacy counter the reproductive interests of wealthy males by making concubinage difficult or impossible and by influencing the possibility of illegitimate offspring by, for example, preventing them from inheriting property.

The Church has been very opposed to concubinage, especially concubinage with a legitimate wife. Social controls often seem to be effective over the ability of illegitimate children to inherit. The church believed that legal marriage produced legitimate children and that others had no legal status, although illegitimate children were sometimes better off than others (see below). The property of illegitimate children was subject to confiscation by the church or the state, to the extent that if a man wanted to leave his property to his illegitimate son who wanted him, he was confronted by the authorities. Illegitimate children completely disappeared from probate during the Puritanera era in England.

Besides the direct influence of the Church, there were various other penalties related to illegitimate births resulting from secular authorities and public opinion. Being a father, especially a mother, to an illegitimate child leads to exile or imprisonment, and it was known among women to do everything in their power to conceal the pregnancy, including leaving the region. These social controls have had an impact on the deaths of illegitimate children. Infant mortality was highest among illegitimate children in both early modern England and France. Women often ostracized their illegitimate children. Illegitimate children are often reported as abortions, which means infanticide, and sometimes women seek to avoid bearing illegitimate children through abortion.

Controls on applying among the elite :Controls of elite enforcement became increasingly influential during the Middle Ages. Thus the twelfth century looked like a turning point. There are good examples from this period of male elites who were able to evade social and ideological constraints favoring monogamy and there are also examples in which such individuals are completely monogamous. General models can be seen by looking at the illegitimate fertility of English monarchs. It is known that ten of the 18 kings who ruled England from 1066 to 1485 had mistresses, and it is known that they were the fathers of forty-one illegitimate sons who could be identified with some degree of certainty. Henry I, who ruled from 1100 to 1135, bore 20 of these sons, and another 5 are listed as probable. No other medieval king had more than 3 sons, and no illegitimate son was ever recorded with certainty for the eight kings.Henry I was distinguished by his apparent interest in acquiring a large number of offspring to expand his territorial ambitions. But Henry treated his illegitimate children less well than his legitimate children, for they were spoiled, court-educated, and made for life as great nobles. On the other hand, illegitimate children were often excluded from inheriting the throne, and often they were not offered marriage. The general change in attitudes and practices regarding marriage that occurred in the 21st century reflects a decline in both the number and importance of illegitimate children over the following centuries.The general change in attitudes and practices regarding marriage that occurred in the 21st century reflects a decline in both the number and importance of illegitimate children over the following centuries.The general change in attitudes and practices regarding marriage that occurred in the 21st century reflects a decline in both the number and importance of illegitimate children over the following centuries.

Controlling sexual behavior in the Middle Ages and after : One of the main goals of the Church in the Middle Ages was to control sexual behavior outside monogamy. Controlling sexual transgressions was an important function of ecclesiastical courts starting from the Middle Ages until the end of the 17th century. These courts were very active in 17th century England pursued cases of incest, incest, and illicit intercourse, although the efficacy of ecclesiastical consequences varied across space and time, there were examples of devastating consequences in which “the victim is harassed by his friends, and deprived of life through boycotts. Society has him and treated him as an outcast.”

In the 17th century, the ability of the Church High Court system to impose penalties, including penalties for adultery, on owners who could expect immunity from other judicial proceedings: “This application of equality before the law did not make the Church popular in the seventeenth century. in England”. Secular authorities such as the justices of the peace also stood ready to prosecute such crimes. For example, according to the Elizabethan statutes, justices of the peace in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries usually sentenced sex offenders of both sexes to public flogging while they were stripped at the waist (for the woman “until her back bleeds”) and put into stills. 

Ideologies Promoting Monogamy Although reliant on the latter on social controls, the Medieval Church developed elaborate ideologies for promoting monogamy and sexual repression. In general, these writings emphasized the moral superiority of celibacy and the sin of extramarital sex of any kind. All sexual relations, apart from monogamy, were universally condemned by every religious authority throughout the early modern period into modern times. Sex within marriage was viewed as a regrettable necessity and a necessary sin, and excessive affection for one wife was considered adultery. While there was a relative loosening of attitudes during the 18th century, in the 19th century a strong anti-hedonist sexual religious ideology emerged.

Abstract : Beginning in the Middle Ages, an elaborate system of social controls and ideologies resulted in the imposition of monogamy in one form or another in large areas of Western Europe. “The great social achievement of the ancient Middle Ages was the imposition of the same rules of sexuality and domestic behavior on both the rich and the poor. And upon the king in his palace, and upon the peasant in his hut: he was not exempt either.” However, the system was by no means totalitarian. Across pre-industrial Europe, there was a positive correlation between affluence and reproductive success.

In Western Europe there was a remarkable continuity within a different set of institutions, which penalized polygamy and directed or completely suppressed non-monogamous sex towards non-reproductive outlets. Despite the changes in these institutions and despite the vast changes in the political and economic structures, the Western family institutions that eventually arose out of the civilization of Rome clearly aimed at the social imposition of monogamy. In general, this effort has been successful.

       Effects of monogamy

       Monogamy is an essential manifestation of the uniqueness of the West, with some important implications. Monogamy may be a necessary condition of Europe’s unique ‘low pressure’ demographic situation. This demographic situation is the result of late marriage and celibacy for large percentages of females during periods of economic shortage. The relationship of this to monogamy is that monogamy results in a situation in which poor people of both sexes are unable to intermarry, while in polyandry systems an increase in poor females only reduces the value of concubines for wealthy men. For example, at the end of the 17th century, try 23% Of both sexes, they remained unmarried between the ages of 40-44. However, due to changing economic opportunities, this percentage collapsed at the beginning of the 18th century to 9%, and there was a corresponding decrease in the age of marriage. Like monogamy, this model was unique among the stratified societies of Eurasia. 

       On the other hand, it appears that the low demographic situation has economic consequences. Not only was the rate of marriage the main constraint to population growth, but this response, especially in England, had a tendency to lag behind favorable economic changes so that there was a tendency to accumulate capital during good periods rather than constant pressure of the population to provide food.

       The fact that continual adjustments between the economy and demographic fluctuations occur at leisure, tend to produce large and even gradual fluctuations in real wages, representing an opportunity to undo the low-income handicap that is sometimes supposed to have held all pre-industrial nations. A long period of raising real wages, by changing the structure of demand, will tend to give a disproportionately strong impetus to the demand for goods beyond the basic necessities of life, giving impetus to sectors of the economy whose growth would matter in the event of an industrial revolution. 

       There has therefore been some logic in assuming that monogamy, by the result of a low-pressure demographic situation, was a necessary condition for industrialization. So, the general pattern was not one where there is a persistent tendency towards late marriage and/or celibacy among females. Instead, marriage is influenced by economic constraints. In times of prosperity, the age of marriage for both sexes was low, and few females remained childless. The result was a marriage system very sensitive to resource availability: “The flexible system of marriage, the focal point of the system, was an important distinguishing feature of Europe, which allowed the population to adjust to the economy.”  This suggests that monogamy may indeed be a central feature of the architecture needed for Western modernization.

Monogamy and Investment in Children Polygamous systems tend to allocate resources to reproduction and relatively less investment in children. For a male in a polygamous society it is attractive to invest in another wife or concubine and less in her son.  In polyandrous societies, investing in additional girlfriends tends to have significant benefits and requires less investment in offspring. Offspring of mistresses are usually given relatively little inheritance and allowed to move down the social ladder. There is a low sex-ratio of offspring among harem women – a preponderance of girls.  In theory, this indicates a bias towards low investment in offspring and this is generally due to the ease of marriage for females. Although the daughters of these mistresses would have a lower social standing than their fathers, they would marry. On the other hand, the sons of the upper classes were targets of competition for the dowry with the lower families. Either way, there is little need for fathers to invest time, energy, or money in the offspring of their mistresses.

       However, monogamy restricts the investment of individual males in the offspring of one woman. With the decline in extended kinship relations (see below) and the institutionalization of monogamy across all social classes, the support of children has come to fall entirely on the shoulders of the independent nuclear family. As explained below, this “simple” family was the crucial instrument of Western modernization.

       The decline of extended kinship relations and the emergence of the simple family : As in the case of monogamy, the church also had a role in the decline of extended kinship relations. In this case, however, church policy was underpinned by the emergence of powerful central governments, which discouraged extended kinship relations and substituted the function of the extended family to ensure individual interests.

       From an evolutionary point of view one often overestimates the potential of kinship relationships. Because of biological kinship ties, close relatives are expected to have common interests, minimum levels of cooperation, and even self-sacrificing behavior. The Germanic tribes that settled in Western Europe at the end of the Roman Empire were organized as kinship groups based on biological relationships between males. These tribes had a strong sense of group solidarity based on the ties of this kinship. “Since the ancient Germans could not count on the protection and aid of a bureaucratic empire when under threat of attack or famine, every man and woman of the group must comply with the basic sociobiological principle of group life embodied in the bonds of familial and communal solidarity.” [27] It was this world based on tribal kinship relations that the kings and the church wanted to destroy.

 

 

Forces rejecting extended kinship It was in the interests of both the church and the aristocracy that kinship groups were largely eliminated. A strong, centralized state with a high concentration tends to underestimate the importance of extended kinship relationships itself, especially if power protects the interests of individuals. From an evolutionary point of view, an extended kinship group has both costs and benefits. The benefits come from the protection and support provided by a wider kinship, but these benefits entail costs in terms of:

  • Increasing demands from relatives on reciprocal services.
  • The fact that kin will tend to prevent any individual from ascending is much higher than others in the kin group.
  • The difficulty of establishing oneself in a kinship building is far from equality. As a result, individuals are expected to avoid involvement in extended kinship groups when their interests are protected by other institutions, that is, removing the benefits of extended kinship relationships, but the costs remain. In general, individuals tend to seek the protection of the extended kinship group when central authority fails, and in turn desert the extended kin group when the state’s authority is sufficient to protect their interest. 

The picture one gets is the gradual development of the aristocratic West based on the simple family free from the obligations towards direct kinship dominating the country people, who are distinguished by the simple family rooted in the community of neighbors and friends, and not by the group of extended kinship. This social construction was an achievement of the late Middle Ages. Extended kinship relations were not insignificant among the rural people in late medieval England and France. 

Church policy : For its part, the Church has contributed to the elimination of extended kinship bonds in Western Europe by rejecting marriage between relatives (marriage of blood relatives) and supporting marriages based on the consent of both partners only. In the case of consanguineous marriages, the church instituted marriages between an expanding group of individuals. In the sixteenth century, Hatra was extended to include second cousins, and in the eleventh century it was extended to include sixth cousins. That is, individuals who share a great-grandfather. It is clear that the taboos on inbreeding go beyond those predicted by evolutionary theory. Moreover, biological relationships were not important here, because marriage was prohibited to similarly distant relatives (ie relatives through marriage) also to spiritually related individuals (ie, relatives of godparents). The effect of this policy was to undermine the extended kinship network and create an aristocracy freed from obligations to the broader kin group.

Whatever the reasoning behind these prohibitions on the part of the Church, there is evidence that the aristocracy complied with ecclesiastical rules. There were few marriages closer than fourth or fifth cousins ​​among the French nobility in the tenth and eleventh centuries. These practices have weakened the extended kin group, because the extended range of incest has precluded the solidarity of extended kin groups by excluding “blood reinforcement by marriage.” 

The result was the spread of biological connections among the nobility rather than being at the top. Immediate descendants of the family also benefited rather than the broader kin group: “Men in high secular positions … sought to enhance their wealth and family to provide the greatest protection for their immediate descendants at the expense of wider kinship” 

       In addition to its kinship policy, the Church’s teaching of consent to marriage served as a force against extended kinship relations. “The family, the tribe, the clan, belonged to the individual. If a man wants to marry enough, he can choose his wife and the Church will protect his decision.” The marriage was the result of an agreement and then validated through sexual intercourse. The Church has established its authority against the traditional bonds of kinship and family by displacing the essential nature of marriage from the control of the family and the secular master to the individuals involved. Freedom to choose a marriage partner was the norm in England during the modern period, and patriarchy was only exercised in the top 1% of the population. 

       The Ethnic Foundations of Western Individualism

       The Magian man is but a part of a spiritual ‘we’, descending from above, one and the same in all who believe in it. The Magian man, as body and soul, belongs only to himself, but there is something else, something strange and transcendent, that lies in him, making him with all his looks and convictions only a part of the consensus, which, like the emanation of God, excludes all possibility of the self-assertion of the ego. The truth for him is something different from what it is for us, that is, for us, specifically the European mentality. All our epistemological methods, based on individual judgment, are for him madness and perfection, and their scientific results are the work of villains, who have confused and deceived the soul regarding its true desires and aims. Herein lies the ultimate, unapproachable secret of the Magian’s thought, in its cave world—the impossibility of thinking, or believing, or knowing the Ego is the postulate in all the essentials of all these religions.

World Vision Alfaustah Faustian mummies world View : “In Olafran von Aishnbach Wolfranvon Eschenback, and Cervantes Cervantes, and Shakespeare Shakespeare, Goethe and Goethe, the tragic life of the individual line of evolution from the inside out, dynamically, and functionally.” “…willing to question even God if the mask which he has shown—or which he has said he has shown—is a lie if it is struck.” 

       To this extent one might suppose that the creation of the single nuclear family based on agreement and love, monogamy, and the collapse of the importance of extended kinship is simply the result of the social processes I have mentioned but the truth is that these changes have occurred faster and more carefully than in any other region of the world. The Western world remains the only cultural region distinguished primarily by all signs of individualism: monogamy, the marital nuclear family, representative government with individual rights against the state, universal morality, and science. Moreover, this culture was built on a strong foundation of the Roman civilization, which had some of these features. Accordingly, I suggest that these tendencies are unique to the Western European cultural region and that they have an ethnic basis.I do not suppose that Western Europeans had unique biological adaptations, but only that we differ in the degree of adaptive characteristics of all humans and that these differences are sufficient to enable the development of a unique human culture. Likewise, all humans characteristically have mental capacities such as symbolic representation and language, However, races show enough quantitative differences in IQ to have a substantial effect on their cultures—perhaps enough to cause at least some quantitative differences.

       I am suggesting that Europeans, in the course of their recent development, have been less subject to natural selection between groups, than Jews and other inhabitants of the Middle East. Originally this was the suggestion of Fritz Lenz, who noted that northern populations developed in a small group due to the harsh nature of the Ice Age, and that they had a tendency towards social isolation.  Such a perspective might not indicate that northern Europeans lacked the collective mechanisms of collective competition. But it only indicates that these mechanisms are relatively less functional and/or require a higher level of collective struggle to unlock their expression.

       This perspective is consistent with ecological theory, that under adverse ecological conditions, adaptations are geared more toward dealing with the adverse physical environment than toward competition with other groups, and in such an environment, there will be less pressure to select for extended kinship networks and larger collective groups.  Evolutionary notions of ethnocentrism focus on the utility of the latter among competing groups. Thus ethnocentrism may be completely insignificant in combating the physical environment, and such an environment may not support large groups.

       The European groups are part of the North Eurasian (relative to Eurasia) and Arctic cultural region.   This cultural area arose from hunter-gatherers adapted to cold, ecologically hostile climates. In such climates there is pressure on the male to provide for the family and a tendency towards monogamy because the climate does not promote neither polygamy nor large groups for an important evolutionary period. These cultures are characterized by bilateral kinship relations in which they recognize both male and female boundaries, indicating a more equal contribution of both sexes as would be expected under conditions of monogamy. There is also less emphasis on extended kinship relationships and marriage tends to be extrinsic, ie, outside the kinship group. All of these features are in contrast with those of the Middle Old World culture region, including the ancestral part of Eurasia. This group culture includes Jews and similar Near Eastern groups.

       This scenario indicates that northern European peoples are more prone to individualism, due to their prolonged presence in an ecological state that does not promote large tribal groups based on extended kinship relationships. Based on mitochondrial DNA, about 80% of the genes of the Orians are from a people who came to Europe from the Middle East 30-40,000 years ago.   This population had persisted firmly through the Ice Ages. It is probable that these European inhabitants, who grew up in the cold and dark northern environment for 40,000 years, evolved not only blond hair and blue eyes but natures and lifestyle preferences to go along with them.

       These inhabitants were hunters and gatherers, not farmers. Due to the relatively low economic production, hunting favors the supply of the male to the female.  This is due to the fact that the vital requirements of the human brain can meet only with a high quality of diet. The human brain accounts for only 2% of the body’s mass but requires 20% of all energy, and 70% in the embryonic stage. This led to a binary bond—the psychological basis of monogamy—in which there is cooperation between female care and male provisioning beginning about 500,000 years ago. Hunting also required “considerable experience, quality education, and years of extensive application”  in other words, requiring highly invested parenting. Besides, it enhances intelligence because hunting for humans depends on cognitive abilities rather than the ability to run or strength. The hunting scenario is complex and ever-changing. All animal species besides individuals exhibit unique behavioral traits that depend on the internal conditions of sex, age, weather, terrain, etc. All of these trends are intense in the northern regions, because there is less energy per unit area.

       Historical evidence shows that Europeans, especially Northeastern Europeans, were relatively quick to abandon extended networks of kinship and collective social structures when their interests were protected by the rise of strong central governments. There is a worldwide tendency for the breakdown of extended kinship networks with the rise of a central authority. In the case of Northwest Europe, however, this tendency soon gave rise to the unique ‘simple family’ style in Western Europe, at least in the late Middle Ages, and perhaps earlier. A simple family depends on a couple and their children. The simple family style was typical of Scandinavians (except Finland), the British Isles, the Low Countries, German-speaking regions, and northern France. This family contrasts with the common family structure typical of the rest of Eurasia where the simple family consists of two or more related partners, usually brothers and their wives. The simple family system, prior to the Industrial Revolution, was characterized by a late age at marriage along with ways to keep unmarried young men occupied as servants and spread among the families of the wealthy. The joint family system was distinguished by the early marriage age for both men and women, a high birth rate, in addition to methods of separation to form two or more families when the situation called for it. 

       The simple family system is a major feature of individualistic culture. The individual family was able to pursue its interests free from the responsibilities and constraints of extended kinship relations and free from the collective suffocation of social structures typical of the rest of the world. Marriage based on individual consent and marital affection was soon replaced by marriage based on kinship and even esteem.

       Most likely this is a relatively large exposure to the formation of a simple family pattern based on ethnic grounds. Not only does the simple family give an environmentally compelling meaning to people adapted to harsh climates, but as was previously shown, this tendency is strong among Germanic peoples. It is interesting to find fundamental differences within France appropriate to the division between the Germanic peoples who lived in the northeast of the “Eternal Line” that connects Saint Malo in the English Channel with Geneva in French-speaking Switzerland. This region developed large-scale agriculture capable of feeding the developing towns and cities, and it did so before the agricultural revolution of the eighteenth century.They were supported by a great group of skilled urban craftsmen, and a great class of medium-sized peasants who owned horses, copper vessels, and glasses, and often shoes, whose sons had a full cheek and broad shoulders, and their children wore little shoes. None of these children had bloated stomachs as a result of rickets as in the Third World. The Northeast became the center of French industry and world trade.

       The Northeast also differs from the Southwest in education rates. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, while the education rate in France as a whole was about 50%, in the south-west it was close to 100%, and differences emerged at least from the seventeenth century, moreover, there was a clear difference in stature, with the North Orientals were about two centimeters tall in a sample of eighteenth-century military recruits. Ladurie notes that the difference in the whole population was greater because the army did not accept many short men from the southwest. Family historians have pointed out that the tendency toward the economically independent nuclear family was more prominent in the north, while there was a tendency toward joint families as one moved south or east. 

       The results strongly suggest that ethnic differences are a contributing factor to the geographic diversity of family forms within Europe. The results indicate that Germanic peoples had a somewhat greater biological tendency toward individualism—a greater tendency toward the social structure of the nuclear family because selection occurred in a long, resource-limited period of their evolution in northern Europe. These groups were less attracted to extended kinship groups, since when the situation changed with the demise of extended kinship networks, the simple family structure rapidly emerged. The simple family structure was adopted relatively easily because this group has had relatively strong predispositions towards the simple family system from its unique evolutionary history.

       As important as these differences between the Germanic peoples and the systems of other European regions are, they do not mask the general difference between Western Europe and the rest of Eurasia. Despite the tendencies towards simple families and the emergence of the demographic transition beginning in the north-east of Europe, it spread rapidly among all western cities.

       Another element in the uniqueness of the West is the habit of placing young men from peasant families as domestic servants in the regions of northeastern Europe distinguished by the simple family. Between 30 and 40% of young people in pre-industrial England were in service, the largest single professional group until the twentieth century. The practice of receiving servants went beyond merely providing for one’s needs by bringing in strangers. Sometimes people take their children to work as servants elsewhere while at the same time receiving unrelated servants.  It was not only the sons of the poor or the landless who became servants, but even more so, that successful farmers sent their sons as servants elsewhere. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries people often received servants early in their marriage, before their sons were able to help, and then passed their sons on to others when they were older and there was enough help.

       This refers to a deeply rooted cultural practice, one that has led to a high level of reciprocity based on a non-kinship basis. Besides, this practice represents a lack of ethnocentrism because people welcome non-relatives as members of the family. These pre-industrial societies were not organized around extended kinship, and it is easy to see that they were already adapted to the industrial revolution and the modern world in general. In the rest of Eurasia, there was a strong tendency towards consanguineous families. 

       Interestingly, in sexually competitive societies such as classical China, maids were the concubines of the head of the household.  Where family resources are transferred directly to reproduction. Thus in the Western European model, wealthy males were much more supportive of non-kin than in the sexually competitive societies of Eurasia. Interestingly, hunter-gatherer societies living in harsh climates often have an elaborate system of reciprocity aimed at sharing resources such as food. I suspect that the non-kinship exchange system so typical of pre-industrial Western Europe was a relic of extended development in harsh northern climates.

       The simple institution of the family, free from involvement in extensive kinship society, was followed by all the other indicators of Western modernization: limited government in which individuals had rights against the state, a capitalist trading system based on individual economic rights, and science as an individual quest for truth. Individualistic societies develop republican political institutions and scientific research institutions that assume that groups are highly permeable and highly vulnerable to splintering when individuals’ needs are not met.

       Individual Marriage: Agreement, Love, and Companionship as the Basis of Marriage

       The rise of the simple family based on the agreement between the two partners has meant that the personal characteristics of the partner become more important compared to the situation in which families are involved in extended kinship relations. In cases where the extended family assumes supremacy, the marriage is usually consanguineous, influenced by the family’s strategy. In a simple family system, partner traits become more important, i.e. all those traits on which partner selection depends, including intelligence, personality, psychological compatibility, and socioeconomic status.

       While collectivist societies focus on genealogy and the degree of genetic relationship in marriage, individualist societies tend to focus on personal attraction, for example, romantic love, and shared interests.  John Money notes a relatively greater tendency of Western European groups towards romantic love as a basis for marriage. Frank Salter notes that Western European groups have a number of individualistic adaptations related to sexual behaviour, including a strong tendency toward mechanisms of romantic and ethnic love, rather than mechanisms of social control to prevent infidelity. At the psychological level, the evolutionary basis for individuality involves mechanisms such as romantic love in which adaptive behavior is intrinsically rewarding Rather than being imposed by family strategies or coercion, as is the case in collectivist cultures. It is the difference between individual courtship between free consent and to some extent equal partners, as opposed to customs such as the Near Eastern civilization’s Purdah where women are locked up and controlled by male relatives until the end of arranged marriage.

       Beginning in the Middle Ages, there was a tendency towards companionship marriage based on affection and agreement between partners, eventually influencing even the marriage decisions of the highest aristocracy.  “While emotional relationships between a man and wife are central in industrialized Western societies, they are not central to social construction in most societies.”  Indeed, this is a general point of conflict between Eastern and Western class societies.  The idealization of romantic love as the basis for monogamy has been a regular feature of secular Western movements of thought, such as Stoicism in late antiquity and Romanticism in the nineteenth century.  This does not mean the lack of love and affection between the two partners in other societies, but only that in Western societies there is a strong emphasis on it.

       Individual consent to marriage, a characteristic of Western marriage since the Middle Ages, is expected to give individuals more weight to the personal characteristics of the future partner. One of the effects of this is a greater age match for the marriage partners. The relative age parity between the two spouses compared to the late marriage age is a sign of the marriage system in Western Europe. The age of marriage for women was higher in Western Europe than elsewhere in Eurasia or Africa, including peasant societies characterized by joint families.  In fact, in a large sample from 1550-1775 the average age of marriage for females fluctuated at about 26 years until 1675, when it began declining just above 24 years in 1800.

       Another result of the simple family was the passion and the pair bonding that became the basis of marriage. Marriage is no longer a matter of political intermarriage between and within kinship groups or a matter of purely economic business, or simply a manifestation of sexual rivalry, but is based on interpersonal attraction, including passion. Passion within marriage became a cultural principle with the rise of the simple family. The Western phenomenon of courtship (one of its kind between the cultures of Eurasia and Africa) has provided a period in which the future partner is able to assess personal compatibility, in Malthusian terms, the opportunity is afforded to both sexes “to discover similar characteristics, and to form those strong and lasting associations without which the married state would be more The production of misery out of happiness. 

       Individualism and the decline of racial consciousness among Europeans

       So far, I have drawn up a scenario, which can be summed up by saying that Western Europeans are relatively non-ethnocentric due to a long period of natural selection in a hostile environment where extended kinship relations are of little use. Freed from the shackles of extended kinship relations, the West has easily adapted to the simple family that animate all other manifestations of modernity: relationship marriage, individual rights against the state, representative government, universal morality, science. The result was a period of unparalleled creativity, conquest, and wealth creation that continued into the present. However, one of the thesis of my book on Jews is that individualism is a poor strategy compared to cohesive group strategies. In the West, extended kinship relations were limited as a prelude to modernization, but this did not completely limit the competition between the group.By the beginning of the nineteenth century there was competition between Jews as a collectivist, as an ethnically conscious group, and among the individualist elites of the West.

       Anthropologically, Jews are descended from the cultural region of the ancient medieval world. This cultural area is somewhat inconsistent with the characteristics of the social organization of the West. As shown in Table 1, Jewish culture is collectivist and prone to ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and moral exclusivity. 

The origins of Jewish culture The origins of European culture  
Pastoralists of the ancient medieval world

(Shepherds)

The fishermen gathered the fruits of the north evolutionary history
Strong mono-patriarchal centrality Weak bi-patriarchal centrality kinship system
Extended family, joint family simple family family system
Internal, consanguineous, polygamous marriage foreign conjugal marriage Marriage practices
Utilitarian, based on family strategy and kinship group control Relationships, based on bilateral agreement and affection The psychology of marriage
relatively low relatively high women’s position
Collective, authoritarian, charismatic leader Individualist, Republican, Democrat social construction
Relatively high “excessive ethnocentrism” relatively low ethnocentrism
Relatively high “excessive xenophobia relatively low xenophobia
It reinforces collective identity, and commitments to the kinship group Promotes independence and self-reliance Socialization
Dogmatism, surrender to authority within the group, and a charismatic leader mind, science

 

 

intellectual position
Moral privacy, internal/external morality, is it beneficial to the Jews? Global Ethics: Ethics is independent of group affiliation moral position الموقف

 

Table 1: Shows the differences in forms of culture between Europeans and Jews

       One of the prominent themes that has appeared multiple places in my books on Judaism is that individual societies are singularly vulnerable to invasion by the cohesive group as historically represented by the Jews. Recent research by evolutionary economists provides a surprising insight into the differences between individual cultures versus cultures. associative. An important aspect of this research is the model for the development of cooperation between individual groups. will provocatively punish dissenters in a “one-shot” game – a game where participants only interact once and so are not affected by the reputations of the people with whom they interact. Thus, this situation is typical of an individualistic culture, because the participants are strangers without kinship ties. The surprising result was that people who made high levels of food donations tended to punish people who didn’t donate, even if they incurred the cost of doing so. Moreover, the punished individuals have changed their ways and donated more in future games even if they know that the participants in the subsequent rounds are not the same as in the previous rounds. The researchers suggest that people from individualistic cultures have a well-developed negative emotional reaction to free riding that manifests itself in punishing such people even at their own expense—hence the term “altruistic punishment.”

 

       This paper mainly provides a model for the development of cooperation between individual peoples. Its findings are more applicable to individualistic groups because such groups are not based on extended kinship relationships and are therefore more prone to splintering. In general, high-level altruistic punishment is more likely to be found among individualists and hunter-gatherers than among kinship and extended family societies. Its results are also less applicable to groups such as groups of Jews or strongly associative groups, which in traditional societies are based on extended kinship relations, known kinship ties, and renewed interaction between members. In such situations, the actors know the people with whom they are cooperating and anticipate future cooperation because they They are drawn into extended kinship networks, or, as is the case with the Jews, they are in the same group.

       Thus, Europeans are exactly the type of groups embodied in this paper: groups with a high level of cooperation with strangers rather than with members of the extended family, and they are subject to market relations as well as individualism.

       This points to the surprising possibility that the key to a group that intends to make Europeans hostile to themselves is to drive their strong tendency toward altruistic punishment by convincing them that they deserve the moral censure of their people. Individualists to the core, Europeans immediately mount a moral apprehension against their own people as soon as they are seen as free riders and are thus culpable—the manifestation of their strong tendency toward altruistic punishment stems from their past evolutionary history as hunter gatherers. In making a judgment about altruistic punishment, the relative genetic distance is irrelevant. Free riders are seen as strangers in a market situation, meaning they have no familial or tribal connections with anticipatory punishers.

       The Puritans as a very important and influential European group are an example of this tendency toward altruistic punishment. The hallmark of Puritanism has been the tendency to pursue utopian issues presented as moral questions—its sensitivity to utopian appeals and to ‘higher law’ and the belief that the main purpose of government is moral. New England was the most fertile ground for the ‘perfection of human belief’ and the ‘father of dozens of ‘isms’  There has been a tendency to portray political alternatives as sharply opposing moral imperatives. With a side depicted as the embodiment of evil – inspired by Satan. In addition to this, the intensity of Puritan morals can be seen in their “deep personal devotion”  and in their strong commitment to living not only a holy life, but also a life of wisdom and toil.

       Puritans waged a holy war in the name of pure morals even against their genetic cousins. The suggestion is that this is a form of altruistic punishment that is found more in groups of cooperative hunter-gatherers than in groups based on extended kinship. For example, regardless of the political and economic complexities that led to the Civil War, it was the moral condemnation of slavery by the Yankees that inspired influential discourse and made the mass slaughter of Anglo-Americans kin in the name of African slaves justifiable in the minds of Puritans. Militarily, the war with the Confederacy resulted in the largest sacrifice of life and property ever offered by Americans. Puritan moral critique and its tendency to justify the draconian punishment imposed on the wicked can be seen in the comments of the old parishioner of Plymouth, Henry Ward Beecher in New York [who] went so far as to call for the “annihilation of the German people … the purification of 10,000,000 German soldiers and apartheid.” for women.” 

       Thus, the present altruistic punishment is a very distinctive characteristic of contemporary Western civilization: once Europeans are convinced that their people are morally bankrupt, all means of punishment must be used against their people. Rather than viewing other Europeans as part of an overall ethnic and tribal community, equal Europeans were seen as morally responsible and an appropriate target for altruistic punishment. For Westerners, morality is individualistic – free riders punish violations of society’s norms through altruistic aggression.

       On the other hand, group strategies that stem from associative cultures, such as Judaism, are immune from such maneuvering because kinship and group bonds take precedence. Ethics is particularistic—everything that is beneficial to the group. There is no tradition of altruistic punishment because the evolutionary history of these groups centers around the cooperation of relatives, not strangers.

       Thus, the best strategy for eliminating Europeans is to convince them of their moral bankruptcy. The main theme is The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements. In that this is precisely what the Jewish intellectual movements did. They presented Judaism as morally superior to European civilization, that European civilization is morally bankrupt and the right target of altruistic punishment. The result was that once Europeans became convinced of their moral corruption, they would destroy their people with an explosion of altruistic punishment. The general dismantling of the culture of the West, and its eventual demise as anything akin to a racial entity, will be prompted by a moral onslaught leading to the culmination of altruistic punishment. Thus continues the intense effort among Jewish thinkers in the ideology of the moral supremacy of Judaism and its role as an oppressed historical victim while at the same time continuing to attack the moral legitimacy of the West. 

       Thus individualistic societies represent an ideal environment for associative and group-directing strategies, such as Judaism. It is of great importance that the problem of immigration of non-European peoples is not confined to the United States at all, but represents a serious and greatly increasing problem in all parts of the Western world and not elsewhere: only peoples of European origin have opened their doors to other peoples of the world and are now taking risks By losing control of the occupied territories for hundreds of years. They did so in large part because of a moral imperative that they themselves recognized and that was used successfully by immigration activists to achieve their own ethnic goals. 

       Western societies have individualistic humanist cultures, which makes restricting immigration difficult. In the 19th century, for example, the Supreme Court twice rejected China’s exclusion laws on the grounds that they targeted a group rather than an individual. Efforts to develop an ideological basis for restricting immigration were tortuous, during the 1990s based on the legitimacy of the ethnic interests of Western Europeans and had racist overtones. It was difficult to reconcile these two ideas with the professed political, moral, and humanistic thought of a republican and democratic society, where Jewish pro-immigration activists such as Israel Zangwill asserted that ethnic and racial group membership formally had no intellectual sanctions. Its opponents have viewed the replacement of these assertions of racial self-interest with the ideology of “assimilability” in the debate over the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 as more than a smokescreen for “racism”. In the end, this intellectual tradition collapsed in large part as a result of the onslaught of the intellectual movements reviewed in this book, and thus a fundamental pillar of defending the ethnic interests of peoples of European origin.

       The most prominent strategy of Jewish thinkers was to promote radical individualism and moral universalism to the point of weakening the entire racial base of society. In other words, these movements took advantage of the fact that Western societies had already embraced a paradigm of individualism and moral universalism, and were strongly inclined to punish their people out of altruism. These movements had the collective effect of undermining the remaining sources of group cohesion among Europeans while leaving intact Judaism as a group-based movement. Depending on the group, the model for this strategy is the work of the Frankfurt School of Social Research, but similar comments can be made on left-wing political thought and psychoanalysis. At its most basic level, identification of non-Jewish groups is an indicator of psychopathology.

       Despite the collapse of extended kinship and the rise of individuality, Europeans did not completely lose the sense of belonging to a larger community. In the United States, Europeans have retained a sense of race-based populism in the twenty-first century. This sense of populism and membership in a race was underpinned by inspired Darwinian knowledge, which not only considered racial differences as established scientific findings, but also regarded the white race as a uniquely gifted race. However, this latest attempt to find a biological meaning for populism has fallen sharply, and is now viewed with horror in academic institutions, largely because of the intellectual movements I discuss in Culture of Criticism. 

 

 

Conclusion

       The ability of individualistic Western societies to defend the legitimate interests of peoples of European descent remains in question. Current trends make one predict that unless individuality is abandoned the end result will be a sharp reduction in the genetic, political, and cultural dominance of European peoples. It would be an unparalleled unilateral concession of such power and an evolutionary scientist would undoubtedly expect such a concession without at least a period of resistance on the part of a large section of the population—perhaps the most ethnocentric among us. Paradoxically, this reaction contrasted with aspects of Judaism by adopting collective ideologies and social organizations serving the group. Whether the decline of the European peoples continues unabated or is curbed, it will establish a profound influence of Judaism as a collective evolutionary strategy on the progress of European societies.

——————————

Kevin MacDonald is Professor of Psychology, University of California (Long Beach), and author of three books on Judaism as an Evolutionary Strategy: A People Who Will Live Alone (1994), Secession and Its Discontents (1998), and The Culture of Criticism (1998), all published by Praeger.

 

 


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